A companion to René Girard’s Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World

The Crowd and the Stone

Once a year, on the Day of Atonement, the high priest of ancient Israel took two goats. One was killed as an offering. Over the head of the other he laid both his hands and confessed all the sins of the people, loading them onto the animal, and then a man led it out into the wilderness and let it go. The sixteenth chapter of Leviticus calls that second goat the one “for Azazel”, and the English Bible of 1530 gave us a word for it, the scapegoat. Today we use that word without thinking about goats at all. A manager blames the intern for a failed launch; a country blames a minority for a recession; a cricket team that loses a series drops the one batsman everyone already disliked. We say “he is being made a scapegoat”, and we mean something precise: he is being blamed for a disorder that is not his, by people who need someone to blame, and his punishment will make them feel better whether or not it fixes anything.

René Girard spent his life on the gap between those two meanings. He was a French literary critic who became an anthropologist almost by accident, taught for decades at Johns Hopkins, Buffalo and Stanford, and was elected to the Académie française in 2005. In 1978 he published a long book built as a set of conversations with two psychiatrists, Jean-Michel Oughourlian and Guy Lefort, and gave it a title taken from the Gospel of Matthew, where Jesus is said to speak in parables to “utter things which have been kept secret from the foundation of the world”. What, according to Girard, had been kept secret? A murder. More exactly, a kind of murder, repeated so often in human prehistory that it built religion, law, kingship, marriage rules and myth, and which works only so long as nobody sees it clearly.

The book is difficult for three reasons, and it helps to name them before you start. It is a dialogue, so ideas arrive when the conversation reaches them, not when you need them. It argues with people the 1970s reader knew by heart, Freud, Lévi-Strauss, Heidegger, Frazer, Durkheim, and assumes you know them too. And it makes one very large claim, then spends four hundred pages showing that the claim explains things in three different fields. If you hold that single claim in your head, the book stops being a fog and turns into a long, patient proof. Here it is, as plainly as I can put it:

Human beings learn what to want by copying one another; copying turns us into rivals; rivalry spreads until a whole community is at war with itself; and the war ends when everyone turns on one victim, whose death brings peace and who is then remembered as a god. All of culture grew out of that event and was designed to hide it. The Hebrew Bible and, above all, the Gospels are the texts that finally tell the story from the victim’s side, and once that story has been told, the old machinery can no longer work.

That is the spine. Everything below hangs from it, in the same order Girard follows: first the anthropology, then the Bible, then the psychology of desire. Read it straight through once, then read his chapters alongside it.

Borrowed wants

Start with two small children in a room full of toys. One of them picks up a red truck. The other, who had shown no interest in the truck for twenty minutes, now wants it more than anything in the world. There are forty other toys within reach. He does not care. The truck has become valuable because someone else reached for it.

Every parent has seen this, and most of us file it under “children are like that”. Girard’s claim is that adults are exactly like that, only better at hiding it, and that this one mechanism matters more for understanding human beings than anything else we know about them. Aristotle had already said, in the Poetics, that man differs from the other animals by his greater aptitude for imitation, and Girard puts that sentence at the very start of his book. Philosophers since Plato have talked about imitation, which the Greeks called mimesis, but they talked about it as copying gestures, words, manners and art. What they left out, Girard says, is that we also copy acquisitive behaviour: we copy the act of reaching for something. He calls this acquisitive mimesis, and it is the seed of his whole system.

Notice what happens next. If I copy your reaching, then my hand ends up on the same object as yours. If the object can be shared, fine. Most of the things people really want cannot be shared: one truck, one job, one woman or man, one throne, one first rank in the entrance exam. So imitation, which is the most cooperative thing we do (it is how a child learns language, how an apprentice learns a trade), turns by its own logic into competition. The model who showed me what to want becomes the obstacle standing between me and it. Girard calls this mimetic rivalry.

And rivalry feeds itself, because it is reciprocal. You want the truck more because I want it; I want it more because you now want it so badly; each of us is the other’s proof that the truck is precious. Every step either of us takes is copied by the other. If you shove, I shove. If you insult, I insult back, a little harder. The two rivals grow more and more alike, and this is a point you should hold on to, because it reverses our usual picture of conflict. We think people fight because they are different. Girard thinks they fight because they have become the same: same desire, same object, same gestures, same hatred. He calls rivals who have reached this point doubles, and the image of the double, the twin, the mirror enemy, will return again and again in the book.

Animals fight too, of course, and they imitate. Girard does not deny it. The difference is one of degree, and degree is everything here. Among apes and wolves, rivalry usually ends in a dominance pattern: one animal gives way, the hierarchy settles, and the loser stops fighting because instinct tells him to. Human mimesis is so strong that it can override that brake. Two men can keep escalating long past the point where any baboon would have given up, because each of them is copying the other’s refusal to give up. That is the danger the rest of the book is about.

If you want an Indian picture of acquisitive mimesis among adults, think of a city where three cafés open on one street, then twelve, because each opening proves to the next investor that the street is “hot”, until rents climb and the cafés start to fail together. Nobody chose that street on its own merits. Each person chose it because the others had. A desire that comes from the object is quiet and can be satisfied. A desire that comes from a rival can never be satisfied, because the rival keeps wanting.

The fence and the dance

Now imagine a small society, a few hundred people, in which mimetic rivalry is not a curiosity but a constant risk. One quarrel over a woman or a piece of meat can pull in two brothers, then two families, then two clans. Since each act of violence is copied by the other side, revenge has no natural end. Every killing calls for another. Girard calls a community in this state a community in mimetic crisis, or a sacrificial crisis, and he thinks every early human society lived in terror of one.

Look, with that fear in mind, at the strange rules archaic societies actually had, the ones nineteenth-century anthropologists collected by the thousand and could not explain. Twins are often killed or exiled at birth. Certain people may not eat certain foods, may not touch certain objects, may not look at certain relatives, may not imitate the gestures or dress of other groups, may not even use the same words. Brothers may not marry women of their own clan. A sick person or a madman is kept apart. These prohibitions look arbitrary. Girard says they are not arbitrary at all. Read them carefully and you find that they forbid, again and again, the things that start mimetic rivalry: being too close to the same objects, being too alike, sharing what cannot be shared. Twins are frightening because they are the image of the double, two identical people with identical claims. The prohibition is a fence put up around the places where the community remembers the crisis started. Its job is to stop imitation before it turns violent.

Then look at ritual, and something odd appears. Where prohibitions forbid imitation, rituals command it. In festival after festival, all over the world, the normal order is turned upside down. Masks erase faces. Kings are mocked and slaves are crowned. People dance in mirror-image rows, fight mock battles, swap clothes, break the very taboos that hold the rest of the year together, eat what is forbidden, mingle the sexes. And then the festival ends, very often with the killing of an animal or, in older times, a person. Why would a society that fears disorder so much stage disorder on purpose?

Girard’s answer is that ritual is a re-enactment. The community is replaying, carefully and on a schedule, the crisis that once almost destroyed it, together with the event that ended it. The disorder is there because it was there the first time. The killing is there because the killing is what brought peace. Ritual, in other words, is a kind of memory that does not know it is a memory. The people performing it are not lying to anyone. They sincerely believe the god demands it. But the shape of the ritual, crisis followed by a death followed by renewal, records what actually happened.

So prohibition and ritual, which look like opposites, are two halves of one strategy. One says: never do again what led to the crisis. The other says: do again, exactly, what ended it.

All against one

We have reached the centre of the book, the thing Girard calls the victimage mechanism, or the scapegoat mechanism, or sometimes the founding murder. Read this section slowly. Almost everything else is a consequence of it.

Go back to the community in crisis. Everyone is fighting everyone, and each fight is over a different object: this woman, that field, that insult. But remember that mimesis does not only copy desires. It copies hostility. If my neighbour is shouting at someone, I am drawn to shout at the same person, for the same reason I was drawn to want the same truck. And here the arithmetic changes. Rivalry over objects divides people, because an object can belong to only one of them. Rivalry over an enemy unites them, because an enemy can be hated by everyone at once. A crowd cannot all own the same field. A crowd can all throw stones at the same man.

So as the crisis peaks, the fights begin to merge. Two quarrels become one quarrel with a common target, then three become one, and the merging speeds up, because every person who joins makes the target look guiltier to everyone else. Girard describes this as a snowball, a mimetic polarization. At the end of it, the whole community, which a moment ago was a war of all against all, has become a war of all against one. The one is killed or driven out. And then something astonishing happens: peace. The rage is spent. The rivals look at each other and find they are no longer rivals, because for a moment they wanted the same thing and got it. The community has been saved.

all against all all against one polarization
The victimage mechanism. Scattered rivalries, each over a different object, converge by imitation on a single target. The crowd’s unanimity is what produces peace.

Now ask what the people who did this will think about it afterwards. They will not think, “we were all crazy and we killed a random man”. They cannot think that, because the whole mechanism works by each of them being sincerely convinced, through the others’ conviction, that the victim was guilty. Girard insists on this point, and it is the one that most readers find hardest at first: the mechanism works only if it is not understood. The victim is not chosen cynically. If the crowd knew the victim was innocent, the unanimity would break and the peace would not come.

So the community concludes two things about its victim, and the two together are the birth of the sacred. First, the victim caused the crisis. All that disorder, the fighting, the confusion, perhaps the epidemic or famine that came with it, was his doing. Second, the victim ended the crisis, because the moment he died, peace came. A being who can bring total chaos and then total peace is not an ordinary human. He is a god. Girard calls this the double transference: the community’s own violence is transferred onto the victim, first as guilt, then as saving power. The victim becomes both monster and saviour, accursed and holy, and this is why archaic gods are so often both terrifying and kind, why the same word in many languages means both “holy” and “unclean” (the Latin sacer is Girard’s favourite example), and why the sacred is always associated with violence.

From here the rest of archaic religion follows almost mechanically. Having been saved once, the community wants to stay saved. So it does three things. It forbids the actions that led to the crisis: those are the prohibitions. It repeats the event that ended the crisis, using a substitute victim, a prisoner, a slave, a child, later an animal: that is ritual sacrifice. And it tells a story about what happened, from the point of view of the persecutors, in which the victim really was guilty and really was divine: that is myth. Prohibition, ritual, myth. Every theory of religion before Girard, he says, took one of these three as the starting point and tried to explain the others from it. Frazer started from ritual and magic, Durkheim from the social group worshipping itself, Freud from a primal murder of a father, Lévi-Strauss from myth as a system of signs. Each saw a piece. None of them saw that all three come out of one real event.

Two things about sacrifice are worth stressing because they recur through the whole book. The first is substitution. Ritual does not need the original victim. It needs someone or something that can stand in, close enough to the community to absorb its violence, far enough away (a foreigner, an outcast, an animal) that killing it will not start a new cycle of revenge. Over long periods sacrifice slides from humans toward animals, and later still toward vegetables and symbols. The second is efficacy. Girard does not think sacrifice is superstition. It works, or worked, in the sense that it really did discharge violence and hold communities together, which is exactly why it lasted so long. That is uncomfortable, and it is meant to be. He is not saying ancient people were stupid. He is saying they had found the only cure for their violence that was available without understanding it.

Why should we believe any of this, given that nobody saw it happen? Girard’s defence is the defence any scientist would give for a hypothesis about something unobservable: it explains a huge range of facts that were previously unexplained, with one mechanism, and it explains why the facts take the form they do. Read the first chapter of his book as a lawyer reads a case: not “is this proven?” but “does anything else account for all the evidence?”.

What grew from the corpse

If you accept the victimage mechanism, you can do something nobody had managed before: you can derive the main institutions of human culture from it, one after another. Girard’s second chapter tries exactly this, and it is the part of the book where he moves fastest, so here are the main lines.

Take sacred kingship. In many African and Pacific societies studied by anthropologists such as A. M. Hocart and James Frazer, the king was a bizarre figure. He was made to break the gravest taboos at his coronation, often committing ritual incest; he was insulted and attacked by his subjects; in some cases he was ritually killed when he grew old, or a substitute was killed in his place. Why would anyone design a monarchy like that? Girard’s answer: the king began as a victim whose execution was postponed. The community chose someone to play the scapegoat, treated him as sacred (because the victim is sacred), and in the interval before his death his sacredness turned into authority. The mock trial and the incest are traces of the guilt the victim must carry. Over time the delay grows longer, the substitution of other victims becomes normal, and the original victim turns into a ruler. Political power, on this view, is a sacrificial victim who managed to survive his role.

Rituals are not one thing, either, and the chapter spends time on how a single original pattern can split into many institutions: festivals, initiation rites, games and contests, theatre, medicine (the sick person treated like a victim, the cure as an expulsion), even the law court, which is a way of directing violence at a single culprit in a manner the community accepts as final. Girard calls this the polyvalence of ritual: a sacrificial ritual already contains, in germ, many specialized functions that later separate and forget their common origin.

He proposes, more tentatively, that the domestication of animals started here too. Societies needing substitute victims kept animals around the camp, fed them, sometimes treated them like members of the group, so that they would be close enough to the community to serve as substitutes. Taming was a side effect of preparing victims. He reads ritual hunting the same way, as sacrifice carried outward, with the prey given the honours and the guilt of a victim.

Then marriage. Lévi-Strauss had argued that exogamy, the rule of marrying outside one’s own group, exists so that groups can exchange women and so tie themselves together. Girard turns this upside down. The rule does not begin as a positive desire to exchange. It begins as a prohibition: the women closest at hand, inside the group, are exactly the objects most likely to set brothers and cousins at each other’s throats, so they are forbidden. Exchange is what is left once the dangerous objects are fenced off. The same goes for food rules and many other “systems of exchange”. The negative comes first, the positive second.

Last in the chapter come funeral rites. Why does every human culture treat the dead body with such care and fear? Girard suggests the first corpse that mattered to a human group was the corpse of the victim, the dead thing that brought peace. The emotions it aroused, terror and gratitude together, are the emotions of the sacred, and they attach thereafter to every death. Death itself, as something sacred, begins with a killing.

The third chapter of Girard’s book asks a still bigger question: how did an animal become human at all? The usual story of hominization pointed to tools, hunting or brain size. Girard says none of these explains the jump from animal signalling to human culture, and that the victimage mechanism can. Remember that human-type mimesis overrides the dominance patterns that keep animal fights from becoming lethal. Our ancestors, as their imitation grew stronger, would have faced crises that apes never face. Groups that found the scapegoat mechanism survived; those that did not tore themselves apart. The mechanism then created the conditions for further change: prohibitions made a protected space where infants could grow up slowly, which allows bigger brains and longer learning, which strengthens mimesis, which makes the mechanism still more necessary. Culture and biology ratchet each other forward.

Girard adds one more idea here that you should not skip, because he relies on it later. What makes humans human is not only tools but symbolic thought, the ability to let one thing stand for another. Where did that come from? Picture the moment after the murder. For the first time, the whole group’s attention is fixed on a single object, the dead victim, and fixed on it with an intensity no animal attention ever had: the body means chaos and peace, sin and salvation. Girard calls the victim the transcendental signifier, borrowing a term from the structuralist philosophers of his day: the first thing that ever meant something, the first sign. Language, ritual and meaning all start from the corpse at the centre of the circle. The phrase is jargon, but the idea is simple. The first word was a name for the victim.

How myths keep a secret

If the founding murder is real, why does no myth simply say so? Girard’s fourth chapter answers: because myths are written by the murderers, and the murderers never knew what they were doing. Myths are the story told by the crowd, and so they distort the event in predictable ways, which is good news, because predictable distortions can be read through.

Take two myths that Lévi-Strauss had placed side by side in his short book Totemism, one from the Ojibwa of the Great Lakes, one from Tikopia in the Pacific. In the Ojibwa story, six supernatural beings come out of the sea to live among humans. One keeps his eyes covered; when curiosity makes him peek at a man, the man drops dead. His companions send him back into the water, and the other five become the founders of the five clans. In the Tikopia story, the gods hold contests of speed and strength for a visiting god, Tikarau, who pretends to be injured and then runs off with the feast; the others chase him, he falls, and they recover four foods that become the staple crops of the island while he escapes to the sky.

Lévi-Strauss read these as logical operations: the myth removes one element from a continuous set so that the remaining ones become distinct, five clans out of six, four foods out of a heap. He called this radical elimination, and treated it as a feature of thought. Girard agrees with the structure and asks the obvious question Lévi-Strauss did not ask: what does “elimination” mean when the eliminated thing is a person? Look at the stories again. A confusion between gods and humans (that is, a crisis in which differences dissolve). Contests and rivalry. A single figure blamed for a death or a theft. A chase, a fall, an expulsion. Then order: clans, crops, culture. That is the victimage mechanism told by those who did it. The one being whose look kills is the one the crowd needed to be guilty. The phrase in the Tikopia myth that the god who pretended to fall finally “took a real fall” is, Girard says drily, rather sinister.

Myths, then, carry two kinds of signs. There are signs of negative connotation, where the victim is evil, monstrous, guilty, the cause of plague or theft. There are signs of positive connotation, where the same victim is a benefactor, founder, giver of crops or clans. Earlier myths show both. Later ones tend to soften or erase the violence as the community grows uncomfortable with it, until in late, polished mythologies the murder has disappeared completely and the god simply leaves or turns into a star. Girard argues that this progressive erasure is the direction of mythological history, and that the more refined a myth looks, the more completely it has hidden its own origin.

The victims themselves also carry marks. Across the world, the people chosen for collective violence tend to have certain features: a limp, a deformity, a foreign origin, an illness, an unusually high or unusually low position, a reputation for some monstrous crime. These are victimary signs, the marks that make a person easy to single out once the crowd is looking for someone. The most famous mythological victim of all, Oedipus, has nearly every one: he is lame (his name is usually read as “swollen foot”), a foreigner in Thebes, a king, and accused of the two crimes, parricide and incest, that dissolve all family differences and so stand for the crisis itself. The plague in Thebes, which Sophocles opens his play with, is the crisis; the expulsion of Oedipus is its cure. Girard reads the Oedipus myth as a lynching told by the lynchers.

How do we know we can read myths this way? Because we already read certain other documents this way, without any hesitation. Girard’s fifth chapter is about what he calls texts of persecution: medieval accounts of Jews accused of causing epidemics, records of the Inquisition, transcripts of witch trials. These documents are written by persecutors who believe every word. They say the witch caused the hailstorm and the cattle deaths and that her execution was just. No modern reader believes them. Yet no modern reader thinks the trials were invented either. We read straight through the persecutors’ story to the real event: there was a crisis, people were frightened, they blamed a woman with some victimary sign, and they killed her. We trust the text about the killing and distrust it about the guilt. Girard asks only that we apply the same reading to myths. Oedipus is a witch trial written by the Thebans.

And this, he says, is a uniquely modern and Western achievement. Our very word “scapegoat” has two senses. One is the ritual sense in Leviticus, a goat driven out on purpose. The other, the everyday modern sense, describes a spontaneous process we recognize as unjust: “he was made a scapegoat”. That second meaning is the remarkable one. A culture capable of saying it has learned to see the mechanism from outside, to suspect the crowd. Girard thinks that ability did not arrive by chance, and he even suggests that it is what made modern science possible. People did not stop burning witches because they had discovered meteorology. They could develop meteorology once they stopped looking for a guilty person behind every storm. The search for natural causes needed, first, a loss of faith in persecutory ones.

That raises the question that turns the whole book: where did we get the ability to see the scapegoat as innocent?

The book that sides with the victim

Girard’s answer is the Bible, and here many readers either get excited or get suspicious. Keep your judgement for later. The argument at this stage is literary and comparative, and you can follow it whatever you believe.

Start by noticing that biblical stories look like myths. They are full of brothers fighting, crises, expulsions, founding murders. Cain kills his brother Abel, and immediately afterwards Cain is described as building the first city. That is the shape of Rome’s founding story, in which Romulus kills his twin Remus and founds the city. Joseph is thrown into a pit by his eleven jealous brothers and sold into slavery; later, in Egypt, he is falsely accused of trying to seduce his master’s wife and is thrown in prison. That is the shape of the Oedipus story, a lone man accused by a group of a sexual crime and driven out. Moses is expelled from Egypt, and Egypt is struck by plagues, as Thebes was.

But at each point the Bible tells the story the other way round. In the Roman version, Remus deserved to die: he jumped over his brother’s wall, he broke the rule, and the murder is justified as the act that founded order. In Genesis, God says to Cain, “the voice of thy brother’s blood crieth unto me from the ground.” The murder founds a culture, yes, and the culture’s first law, the mark of Cain that threatens sevenfold vengeance on anyone who kills him, is a law to stop the cycle of revenge. But the text is unambiguous that Abel was innocent and the founder was a murderer. In the Joseph story, the brothers are jealous and lying, the accusation of Potiphar’s wife is false, and at the end Joseph, now powerful, refuses to take revenge on the brothers who sold him and forgives them. Where myths say the victim was guilty and the crowd was right, the Bible says the victim was innocent and the crowd was wrong. Same events; opposite verdict.

Girard follows this reversal through the Hebrew scriptures: the Psalms in which a lone man cries out against the crowd encircling him, the Book of Job (whom his friends try to convince he must be guilty, since he is suffering), the prophets who attack sacrifice and say God wants mercy rather than offerings, and above all the “Suffering Servant” of Isaiah, a figure despised and rejected, struck down for the sins of others, whom the text calls innocent. The Hebrew Bible, in his reading, is a long struggle out of the mythic and sacrificial view, never quite complete. God is still sometimes violent in it; the people still sacrifice. But the movement is always in one direction: toward the side of the victim.

In the Gospels the movement is completed. Here the passion of Jesus is told in exactly the form of a founding murder, with every element in place. There is a crisis in Jerusalem. There is a crowd that cheers him on Sunday and calls for his death on Friday, shifting by imitation. Rival authorities who normally hate each other, the Jewish priests, the Roman governor Pilate, King Herod, are united by the victim; Luke even notes that Herod and Pilate became friends that very day, having been enemies. Even his own disciples join in: Peter, the closest of them, warming himself among the crowd by the fire, denies him three times, because a servant girl’s accusation is enough to pull him into the crowd’s mood. The victim is mocked as a false king. The high priest Caiaphas states the logic of the whole mechanism out loud: “it is expedient for us, that one man should die for the people, and that the whole nation perish not.” Girard calls this the most explicit statement of the scapegoat principle in any text.

The difference is that this time the story is told by the victim’s friends, after the fact, and it says plainly that he was innocent. “They hated me without a cause,” the Gospel of John has Jesus say, quoting a psalm. On the cross he says, “Father, forgive them; for they know not what they do,” and Girard takes this literally: the persecutors do not know; the mechanism depends on their not knowing; and the Gospel is the text that knows.

That is why Girard names his book after the verse he does. Jesus, in Matthew, speaks of revealing “things kept secret from the foundation of the world”. And in a speech against the scribes and Pharisees (the long passage of “woes” in Matthew 23 and Luke 11), he accuses them of building tombs for the prophets their fathers killed while saying they would never have taken part, and warns that this generation will be held to account for “the blood of all the prophets, which was shed from the foundation of the world, from the blood of Abel unto the blood of Zacharias”. Abel is the first murder in the Bible, Zechariah one of the last in the Hebrew canon. The thing hidden since the foundation of the world is the founding murder, and its hiding place is the tomb, the monument, the culture built on top of the victim. Girard reads the word “Pharisees” here not as an attack on Jews (he is explicit that the passage is addressed to every human community, the reader included) but as a description of anyone who says, “if we had lived then, we would not have joined the crowd”.

Last, Girard gives a new reading of Satan. In the Gospel of John, Jesus says the devil “was a murderer from the beginning” and “the father of lies”. Girard takes these two titles together. The beginning is the founding murder; the lie is the myth that covers it. Satan is not a horned person but a name for the mimetic and victimage process itself: the accuser (that is what the Hebrew satan means), the force that sets people against each other and then unites them against a victim, and which is “cast out” whenever that process is exposed. The question Jesus asks in the Gospels, “How can Satan cast out Satan?”, describes exactly what the scapegoat mechanism does: it uses violence to expel violence, and so the order it produces can never be stable.

A death that is not a sacrifice

Here Girard picks a fight with most of Christian theology, and you should know in advance that this is the most controversial part of the book, including among Christians.

The usual way of understanding the cross, for many centuries, has been sacrificial: God the Father demanded a payment for human sin, and Jesus was the offering, the lamb whose blood was required. Girard says this reading turns the Gospels back into myth. If God demands a victim, then God is the old violent sacred again, and the death of Jesus is one more founding murder that happens to have a happy ending. Read the texts carefully, he argues, and you find no such demand. Jesus dies not because God wants blood but because people do. He dies because he refuses to take part in the violence and refuses to flee from it, and a man who does both in a world built on the victimage mechanism will be killed. His death is the consequence of a nonviolent life in a violent world, not a payment. This is what Girard calls the non-sacrificial reading of the Gospels.

Look, with that lens, at what Jesus actually preaches. The Kingdom of God in the Sermon on the Mount is a set of rules for breaking the mimetic cycle: do not return a blow; love your enemies; do not judge; forgive without limit. These are not sweet sentiments. They are the only exits from reciprocal violence, the only ways to stop copying the rival. Jesus offers them to his listeners as an alternative to the sacrificial order. Girard argues that the offer was refused, and that the cross is what refusal looks like.

The refusal has consequences, which is how Girard reads the frightening apocalyptic passages of the Gospels, where Jesus foretells wars, nation rising against nation, and families divided. Most readers take these as threats of divine punishment. Girard says they are predictions about human beings. Once the scapegoat mechanism has been exposed, it stops working, because it needs ignorance to work. And a world that has lost its sacrificial protection but has not accepted the Kingdom’s rules will be left alone with its own violence, with nothing to discharge it. The apocalypse is not God’s wrath. It is ours, set free. Writing in the 1970s, Girard pointed out that humanity now had, for the first time, the technical means (nuclear weapons) to destroy itself completely, so this was no longer a far-fetched reading. Our only choices, he says, are the Kingdom or the apocalypse.

This leads him to two theological claims you may or may not accept, but should understand. On the divinity of Christ: in myth, the victim becomes a god because the crowd killed him. Girard says Jesus is the opposite case: his divinity is not produced by the lynching (the crowd, after all, did not worship him, and his disciples ran away). He is divine because he alone stood entirely outside the mimetic violence and could therefore reveal it. A victim deified by his murderers is a mythic god; a victim who reveals his murderers’ mechanism, Girard argues, is something else. On the virgin birth: mythic gods are typically born of violence, Zeus seizing a mortal woman, gods born from rape or from monstrous struggle. The Gospel birth story is notable for the complete absence of that violence. Girard reads it as a sign of the same break.

Why, then, did Christianity itself come to read the cross sacrificially? Here Girard is hard on the history of his own religion. The Epistle to the Hebrews, an early Christian letter, already presents Jesus as the perfect sacrifice that replaces all the others, a high priest offering his own blood. Girard thinks this was the inevitable first step: people steeped in sacrificial thinking could only understand the cross in sacrificial terms. And so historical Christianity, which he distinguishes sharply from the Gospel text, rebuilt a sacrificial culture on top of a text that undermines sacrifice. It made God violent again, it persecuted, it found new scapegoats, Jews, heretics and witches among them, and it did all this in the name of the very victim whose story condemned it.

He draws the distinction he needs from one of the most famous stories in the Hebrew Bible, the Judgement of Solomon in the First Book of Kings. Two women claim the same baby. Solomon calls for a sword and orders the child cut in two. One woman accepts: let it be neither mine nor yours. The other cries out to give the child to her rival, so long as it lives, and Solomon gives the child to her as its true mother. Girard reads the two women as two kinds of “sacrifice”. The first accepts the sacrifice of the other, the child, rather than lose to her rival: that is the archaic logic, where the rivals are doubles and a victim settles the dispute. The second accepts the sacrifice of herself, her claim and her desire, so that the child may live. The word “sacrifice” covers both, and Christianity’s confusion between them is exactly the confusion between the old sacred and the Gospel. Christ’s death, Girard says, is like the good mother’s choice: he gives up himself rather than let anyone else be killed. The sacrificial reading confuses this with the first kind.

Even so, Girard does not think the Gospel failed. The revelation, he argues, has been working inside history all along, slowly, underneath the sacrificial Christianity that covered it. That is why modern Western culture, for all its violence, is the first culture obsessed with victims, the first to ask whether the condemned were innocent, the first to write the history of persecution from the side of the persecuted. It is also why that same culture has been unable to restore the old sacrificial stability: every new scapegoat is quickly unmasked. Our knowledge, including scientific knowledge, is the long, indirect effect of that text. And our danger is the same effect: a world that can no longer scapegoat in good conscience, but still wants to.

He uses this to reject a contemporary academic trend too. Some literary theorists of the 1970s, the semioticians, offered a reading of the Gospels as a system of signs in which the death of Jesus is a structural necessity of the text. Girard calls this a new sacrificial reading: it treats the victim as a function the story needs, which is exactly how myths treat their victims, and so it cannot see what the text is saying about the victim.

The last chapter of this part compares two uses of the Greek word logos, which means word, reason, order. For the philosopher Heraclitus, around 500 BC, the logos was the hidden order of the world, held together by strife; “war is the father of all”, says one of his fragments. Martin Heidegger, in his lectures on early Greek thought, made this Heraclitean logos central to his philosophy, a gathering-together that is also a violent struggle. Girard says the Logos of Heraclitus is the logos of the victimage mechanism: order made by violence, unity forged by expulsion. The Gospel of John opens with a different logos: “In the beginning was the Word”. And it continues, a few verses later, that the light shone in the darkness and the darkness did not comprehend it, and that “he came unto his own, and his own received him not”. The Logos of John is a logos that is expelled. It is the word of love, which violence cannot hold and so throws out. Heidegger, Girard argues, saw that the two logoi were different but failed to see that the difference is the difference between the persecutors and the victim. Philosophy, the great Greek invention, belongs on the persecutors’ side.

Wanting to be someone else

The third part of Girard’s book is where the two psychiatrists finally get the conversation they wanted from the start: the question of desire. Girard made them wait for it, because he believed you cannot understand individual psychology until you have seen the collective machinery. Now he turns the same theory inward.

He begins by distinguishing two stages of mimesis. In the first, we copy a model in order to get an object. In the second, the object fades and what we really want is the model’s being. If I imitate my rival’s desire for long enough, I start to believe he possesses something I lack, a fullness or self-sufficiency, and that if I could only win what he wants I would become him. Girard calls this metaphysical desire: desire aimed not at a thing but at a way of being, which the rival seems to possess. The object becomes a token. The novels of Cervantes, Stendhal, Flaubert, Dostoevsky and Proust, which Girard had studied in his first book, are full of such people: the snob who wants to enter a salon only because he is not welcome there, the lover who desires a woman only because a rival desires her.

Ordinary development already contains a trap here. A child is told by a parent or teacher, in effect, “imitate me”. The child does, and imitates the model’s desire too, and soon reaches for what the model reaches for. Then the model says, “not that; that is mine”. Girard borrows a term from the anthropologist Gregory Bateson, who used it in a 1956 paper on schizophrenia: the double bind, a pair of contradictory commands, “imitate me” and “do not imitate me”, from which there is no escape. Bateson thought it was a special pathology of certain families. Girard thinks it is the ordinary condition of mimetic desire. Anyone we copy will, the moment we copy them too well, stand in our way. Learning (the mimesis of apprenticeship) and conflict (the mimesis of rivalry) are the same movement at two moments.

From this Girard builds what he calls an interdividual psychology. The word is invented on purpose. Modern psychology, he says, takes the individual as its unit, a self with its own desires that then meets other people. He thinks this is backwards. There is no self prior to the relation; the self is formed by the models it copies and the rivals it fights. Psychology should study what happens between people. Our sense of having a stable, autonomous self is, in his view, a kind of romantic illusion.

He then reinterprets a whole range of symptoms in these terms. When two rivals are locked together, their positions keep swapping: now I am up and my rival is down, now the reverse. Girard calls these symptoms of alternation, and he reads the swings between elation and despair that psychiatry describes in manic-depressive states as the inner experience of that see-saw. When the rivalry becomes total, the object disappears completely and only the rival is left, a double who seems to follow you everywhere and whom you cannot tell apart from yourself. That, he suggests, is the structure of psychosis, where the other appears as a persecuting double and the boundary of the self gives way. And at the furthest point, the self can be entirely taken over by a model, which is what happens in hypnosis and in the possession states known from many religions: the subject’s desire is simply the model’s desire, without resistance. Oughourlian, who was a specialist in possession, contributes much of this section.

Sexuality gets the same treatment. Why would anyone desire an obstacle, or seek suffering? Mimetic theory has an answer. If what makes an object valuable is the rival who blocks it, then a person who has been disappointed often enough by easy objects will start to seek out obstacles directly, as signs that something precious lies behind them. That is Girard’s account of masochism: not a love of pain as such but a love of the obstacle, of the model who rejects us, because rejection seems to prove superiority. The sadist plays the opposite role, imitating the model’s apparent contempt in order to feel what the model feels. Theatrical sado-masochism stages this relation deliberately. Girard also offers a mimetic account of some forms of homosexual desire, in which attention originally fixed on a rival gradually shifts so that the rival himself becomes the object. He presents this as a hypothesis about one route among others; it is a 1978 argument and the reader should weigh it as such. His main example is Dostoevsky’s short novel The Eternal Husband, in which a widower seeks out his dead wife’s former lover, brings him to meet the young woman he now wishes to marry, and cannot desire her without the rival’s presence.

All of this leads to a long quarrel with Freud, which takes up two chapters and is one of the hardest stretches of the book, because it assumes you know Freud’s texts. The core of it is this. Freud saw mimesis. In his writings on group psychology he gives a central role to identification, the child’s wish to be like the father. But then, Girard says, Freud let that discovery be swallowed by a theory in which desire is fixed on its object from the start: the boy desires his mother, sees the father as a rival, and the drama follows. Girard turns the order round. The boy identifies with the father first, and therefore desires what the father desires, the mother; the rivalry is a product of imitation, not of an innate object choice. Freud’s Oedipus complex is a mimetic triangle mistaken for an archetype. Girard calls Freud’s reliance on fixed archetypes a form of Platonism, after Plato’s eternal Forms, and he wants to end Platonism in psychology: no innate scripts, only relations that can go in many directions. He makes a similar point about Freud’s appeal to a constitutional bisexuality, which Girard says Freud needed in order to explain identifications his theory could not otherwise handle, and which mimesis explains without extra assumptions.

The sharpest and wittiest part of this quarrel is about narcissism. In his 1914 essay “On Narcissism”, Freud described a type of woman (and he also mentions children, cats and great criminals) who seems entirely self-sufficient, who loves herself, and who for that reason fascinates others, who envy her apparently whole and untroubled state. Girard says Freud is describing, without knowing it, the strategy of the coquette: she appears to need no one precisely because that appearance makes her desirable. Her self-sufficiency is not a fact but a performance aimed at the desire of others, and it works because others copy her desire for herself. And Freud’s own fascination with this figure, his envy of a fullness he lacks, is itself a perfect example of metaphysical desire. Freud has written a description of his own desire and called it a theory of hers.

Finally Girard takes on Freud’s late book Beyond the Pleasure Principle of 1920, where Freud, puzzled by patients who compulsively repeated painful experiences, proposed a death instinct, a drive toward destruction built into life itself. Girard thinks Freud was looking at something real, the repetitive, self-destroying pattern of mimetic rivalry, which keeps seeking obstacles and keeps running into the same wall, and misnamed it as a biological instinct. The repetition comes from imitation and rivalry, not from biology. He extends the point to modern culture as a whole, which he sees as increasingly fascinated by its own death, as the rivalries once held in check by sacrifice run on without restraint.

The stumbling block

The last chapter brings everything together through one Greek word from the New Testament: skandalon. It is usually translated “offence” or “stumbling block”, and originally meant a trap or an obstacle that trips you. We get our word “scandal” from it. Girard says the Gospels use it with great precision for the mimetic obstacle: the model who attracts us and blocks us at the same time, whom we cannot stop running into, so that the more we stumble, the more drawn we are to stumble again. When Peter tries to stop Jesus from going to Jerusalem to die, Jesus turns on him: “Get thee behind me, Satan: thou art an offence unto me”. Peter, wanting his master to be powerful and safe, has become a skandalon, a model of worldly desire. Scandal, Satan and mimetic rivalry are three names for one thing.

Against the skandalon the Gospels set a different kind of model. Girard does not say we can stop imitating. Imitation is what humans are. The choice is whom to imitate. A rival model always becomes an obstacle, because he wants what we want and wants to be what we want to be. Jesus, as the Gospels present him, is a model who wants nothing that we could take from him, imitates only the Father, and so cannot become a rival. Imitating him leads away from rivalry. “Blessed is he, whosoever shall not be offended in me,” Jesus says in Matthew, and Girard reads it as: blessed is the one who does not turn me into a stumbling block. The Gospel stories end, he notes, with the women going to the tomb wondering who will roll away the great stone, and finding it already rolled away. Behind every obstacle we fix on, there is only a dead body. The stone has been moved.

In the same chapter Girard tells the story of a literary conversion. Marcel Proust spent years writing an early novel, Jean Santeuil, in which his hero is a sort of romantic idealization of himself, always right, always wounded by snobs and rivals. He abandoned it. In In Search of Lost Time the narrator finally sees that his own loves and social ambitions were copies of other people’s desires, that he was as much a snob as anyone he mocked. Girard thinks this recognition, which appears as the great revelation of the last volume, is a conversion in a quasi-religious sense: the death of an old self that believed in its own autonomy, and the birth of a writer who can see mimesis because he has seen it in himself. The great novelists, in his view, reach by literature the same insight the Gospels reach by revelation.

He uses the same lens on psychotherapy, which he thinks often works sacrificially, by finding someone to blame (the parents, society, the past) so that the patient can expel the bad and feel whole. And he reads the structural psychoanalysis of his time, mainly the school of Jacques Lacan, as one more brilliant system that sees the triangle of desire but still treats it as a fixed structure rather than a living, reversible relation between people.

The book ends with a conversation called “To Conclude”, where the psychiatrists push Girard on obvious objections. Is this science or theology? Girard answers that it is a hypothesis, and should be judged like one: by how much it explains, how simply, and whether a better explanation turns up. He admits he cannot prove the founding murder happened, any more than a biologist can watch the origin of a species, and he argues that the human sciences have been too timid to propose any grand hypothesis at all. He insists that the hypothesis was not invented by him but read out of the texts, the Gospels above all, which said it first. He attacks the intellectual fashions of the late 1970s, the deconstruction and cynicism that he thinks dissolve every meaning except the one that matters, and he ends where the theory leads: humanity, for the first time, has no sacrificial exit left, and the means to destroy itself. The only way out of mimetic violence that does not require a victim is the one the Gospel names. Either we renounce violence entirely, or we will have it entirely.

Go back to the goat in the wilderness. The ritual in Leviticus was honest about one thing: it admitted that the community’s sins were being loaded onto an innocent animal. It only got the direction wrong. It thought God required the expulsion. Girard spent four hundred pages arguing that every human culture began with a crowd and a victim and a stone, that each culture told the story so that the crowd came out right, and that the world changed the day someone wrote the story down from the other side.

You do not have to accept all of it, and many serious readers have not. The anthropology is a hypothesis about events nobody saw; the reading of Freud is a polemic; the theology divides Christians. But the core observation is unusually easy to test, and you can test it on yourself tonight. Notice the next time you want something only because someone else wants it. Notice the next time a group you belong to feels closer because it has found someone to dislike together. Each time, you will have seen a small piece of what Girard meant by things hidden since the foundation of the world. The secret is not hidden in old books. It is hidden in us, in the place we least like to look.

“Father, forgive them; for they know not what they do.” Girard asks you to take the second half of that sentence literally. The whole book is an argument that they did not know, and that we are the first people who can.

· · ·

Notes

The chapter above is meant to be read straight through. The notes below are for revision and for reading Girard’s book alongside it.

Terms

Open the glossary
Mimesis
Greek for imitation. For Girard, the human tendency to copy others, including what they desire, not only how they speak or act.
Acquisitive mimesis
Imitation of another person’s act of appropriating an object. It turns imitators into rivals, since their hands converge on the same thing.
Mimetic rivalry
Conflict produced by imitation: the model becomes an obstacle, and each rival’s desire intensifies the other’s.
Metaphysical desire
Desire aimed at the model’s being rather than at any object; the object becomes a token of the fullness the rival seems to have.
Doubles
Rivals who have become identical in desire, behaviour and hostility. Mythic twins and enemy brothers are images of doubles.
Mimetic (sacrificial) crisis
A state in which rivalry spreads through a community and dissolves the differences (of rank, family, role) that normally keep order.
Victimage (scapegoat) mechanism
The spontaneous convergence of a community’s violence on a single victim, whose expulsion or death restores peace through unanimity.
Founding murder
The original collective killing from which, on Girard’s hypothesis, religion and culture arose.
Double transference
The victim is first held responsible for the crisis (malevolent), then for the peace that follows (beneficent), and so becomes sacred.
Prohibition
A rule forbidding the behaviours, closeness and resemblances that set off mimetic crisis.
Ritual
The controlled re-enactment of the crisis and its resolution, ending in a sacrifice that substitutes for the original victim.
Myth
The persecutors’ account of the founding event, in which the victim is guilty and/or divine and the violence is hidden or justified.
Substitution
The replacement of the original victim by others, human then animal then symbolic, in ritual sacrifice.
Polyvalence of ritual
The idea that one sacrificial ritual contains the seeds of many later institutions (kingship, law, medicine, theatre, games).
Sacred kingship
Kingship as a postponed sacrifice: the victim whose death is deferred and whose sacredness turns into power.
Hominization
The process by which pre-human primates became human; Girard places the victimage mechanism at its threshold.
Transcendental signifier
Girard’s term for the victim as the first object of collective, symbolic attention, and so the origin of signs and meaning.
Radical elimination
Lévi-Strauss’s term for a myth’s removal of one element from a set; Girard reads it as the trace of a collective expulsion.
Negative and positive connotation
The victim’s two faces in myth: guilty monster and divine benefactor.
Victimary signs
Features that make someone likely to be chosen as a victim: disability, foreignness, extreme social position, alleged monstrous crime.
Texts of persecution
Historical documents written by persecutors (witch trials, anti-Jewish accusations, Inquisition records) that we read through to the real violence.
Sacrificial / non-sacrificial reading
Reading Christ’s death as a sacrifice God required (sacrificial) versus as the result of human violence that the Gospel exposes (non-sacrificial).
Kingdom of God
In Girard’s reading, the Gospel’s rules for renouncing reciprocal violence: no retaliation, love of enemies, unconditional forgiveness.
Apocalypse
Human violence left without sacrificial restraint after the mechanism has been exposed; not divine punishment.
Logos of Heraclitus / Logos of John
Order founded by violence and expulsion, versus the Word of love that violence expels.
Double bind
Bateson’s term for contradictory commands; for Girard, the model’s “imitate me” and “do not imitate me”.
Interdividual psychology
A psychology whose unit is the relation between people rather than the isolated individual.
Skandalon
Greek for trap or stumbling block; the model-obstacle of mimetic desire, which attracts and repels at once.

People and works Girard argues with

Open the list of references
Jean-Michel Oughourlian and Guy Lefort
The two psychiatrists in the dialogue. Oughourlian worked on hypnosis and possession; marked “J.-M. O.” and “G. L.” in the text, Girard is “R. G.”.
Aristotle, Poetics
Source of the epigraph that humans are the most imitative animals.
James George Frazer
Scottish anthropologist, author of The Golden Bough; collected rituals of scapegoats and killed kings, explained them as magic.
Émile Durkheim
French sociologist; religion as society worshipping itself.
A. M. Hocart
Anthropologist of kingship and ritual; argued institutions grow out of ritual.
Claude Lévi-Strauss
Founder of structural anthropology; read myths as systems of differences. Girard uses his analyses of the Ojibwa and Tikopia myths in Totemism.
Konrad Lorenz and ethology
Study of animal behaviour, including ritualized fighting and dominance, which Girard contrasts with human escalation.
Sophocles, Oedipus the King; Euripides, The Bacchae
Greek tragedies Girard reads as close to the victimage mechanism: the plague and expulsion of Oedipus, the tearing apart of Pentheus.
Leviticus 16
The Day of Atonement and the goat sent to Azazel.
Genesis 4 and 37–50
Cain and Abel; Joseph and his brothers.
Isaiah 52–53
The Suffering Servant.
Matthew 13:35; 23; Luke 11
“Things kept secret from the foundation of the world”; the woes against the Pharisees; the blood from Abel to Zechariah.
John 1; 8:44; 11:50
The prologue’s Logos; the devil as murderer and liar from the beginning; Caiaphas’s “one man should die for the people”.
1 Kings 3:16–28
The Judgement of Solomon.
Epistle to the Hebrews
Early Christian text presenting Christ as a perfect sacrifice; Girard’s example of the sacrificial reading.
Heraclitus and Martin Heidegger
Greek philosopher of the logos and strife; the German philosopher who reinterpreted him. Girard contrasts their logos with John’s.
Gregory Bateson
Anthropologist who proposed the double-bind theory of schizophrenia (1956).
Sigmund Freud
Especially Group Psychology (identification), “On Narcissism” (1914), the Oedipus complex, and Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920, the death instinct).
Jacques Lacan
French psychoanalyst behind “structural psychoanalysis”.
Marcel Proust and Fyodor Dostoevsky
Novelists whose work Girard reads as discoveries of mimetic desire: Proust’s Jean Santeuil versus In Search of Lost Time; Dostoevsky’s The Eternal Husband.
Michel Foucault and the deconstructionists
Contemporary critics of the human sciences whom Girard answers in the conclusion.

A reading map for your copy

Page numbers are those of the 1987 Stanford edition. Read the matching section of this chapter first, then the book’s chapter.

Book I, ch. 1 · The victimage mechanism as the basis of religion pp. 3–47

Covered in “Borrowed wants”, “The fence and the dance” and “All against one”. The heart of the book: acquisitive mimesis, prohibition as anti-imitation, ritual as commanded imitation, sacrifice, and the theory of religion. If you master this chapter, the rest follows.

Book I, ch. 2 · The development of culture and institutions pp. 48–83

Covered in “What grew from the corpse”. Kingship, the many functions of ritual, domestication, hunting, marriage rules, funerals. Girard moves fast; read for the pattern, not every example.

Book I, ch. 3 · The process of hominization pp. 84–104

Covered at the end of “What grew from the corpse”. Animal dominance versus human escalation; the victim as first sign.

Book I, ch. 4 · Myth: the invisibility of the founding murder pp. 105–125

Covered in “How myths keep a secret”. The Ojibwa and Tikopia myths and Girard’s argument with Lévi-Strauss.

Book I, ch. 5 · Texts of persecution pp. 126–138

Covered in the second half of “How myths keep a secret”. Why we can read myths as we read witch trials; the two senses of “scapegoat”.

Book II, ch. 1 · Things hidden since the foundation of the world pp. 141–179

Covered in “The book that sides with the victim”. Cain, Joseph, the Psalms, the Passion, the Pharisees, Satan.

Book II, ch. 2 · A non-sacrificial reading of the Gospel text pp. 180–223

Covered in the first half of “A death that is not a sacrifice”. Kingdom, apocalypse, Christ’s divinity, the virgin birth.

Book II, ch. 3 · The sacrificial reading and historical Christianity pp. 224–262

Covered in the middle of “A death that is not a sacrifice”. Hebrews, Solomon’s judgement, the semiotic reading, history and science.

Book II, ch. 4 · The Logos of Heraclitus and the Logos of John pp. 263–280

Covered at the end of “A death that is not a sacrifice”. The hardest philosophical chapter; skim the Heidegger if you have not read him.

Book III, ch. 1–2 · Mimetic desire; desire without object pp. 283–325

Covered in “Wanting to be someone else”. Metaphysical desire, the double bind, alternation, psychosis, hypnosis and possession.

Book III, ch. 3–4 · Mimesis and sexuality; psychoanalytic mythology pp. 326–392

Covered in the second half of “Wanting to be someone else”. Masochism, Dostoevsky, and the long critique of Freud, including narcissism.

Book III, ch. 5 and “To Conclude” · Beyond scandal pp. 393–447

Covered in “The stumbling block”. Proust’s conversion, therapy, the death instinct, the skandalon, and the defence of the hypothesis.

Questions to test yourself

Why, for Girard, do rivals fight because they are alike rather than different?

Because rivalry comes from copying. Imitating each other’s desires puts them on the same object, and imitating each other’s reactions makes their behaviour identical. The more the conflict escalates, the more they resemble one another, until they are “doubles”.

How can prohibition and ritual both come from one event if one forbids imitation and the other commands it?

Prohibitions forbid the behaviours that led to the crisis; rituals re-enact the crisis and, above all, the killing that ended it. Both are attempts to preserve the peace the founding murder brought.

Why must the persecutors not know the victim is innocent?

Because the peace depends on unanimity, and unanimity depends on each person sincerely believing in the victim’s guilt, a belief each takes from the others. A crowd that sees the victim as arbitrary cannot unite against him.

What is the “double transference”, and how does it explain the ambivalence of archaic gods?

The community’s violence is transferred to the victim first as guilt for the crisis and then as the power that ended it. The victim thus appears both destructive and saving, which is why archaic sacred beings are feared and revered at once.

Why can we read myths the way we read witch-trial records?

Both are written by persecutors who believe the victim guilty. We trust the witch-trial records about the violence and distrust them about the guilt. Girard asks us to read myths, such as Oedipus, the same way.

What does the Bible change about stories that otherwise look mythical?

It reverses the verdict. Cain is a murderer and Abel innocent, unlike Romulus and Remus; Joseph is falsely accused and forgives his persecutors, unlike Oedipus. The Gospels tell the Passion as a collective murder from the side of the innocent victim.

What is the difference between the sacrificial and the non-sacrificial reading of the cross?

The sacrificial reading has God require Christ’s death as a payment. The non-sacrificial reading says humans killed him because he refused their violence, and that the Gospels expose the mechanism rather than repeat it.

How does Girard read the Judgement of Solomon?

The false mother accepts the sacrifice of the child rather than lose to her rival (the archaic, sacrificial logic). The true mother sacrifices her own claim so the child lives (self-giving, the Gospel logic). One word, “sacrifice”, covers both.

How does mimetic theory turn the Oedipus complex around?

Freud: the boy desires the mother and so sees the father as a rival. Girard: the boy imitates the father first, and so desires what the father desires; the rivalry is a product of imitation, not an innate object choice.

What is Girard’s objection to Freud’s portrait of the narcissistic woman?

That her self-sufficiency is a strategy (the coquette’s) that draws others’ desire by appearing to need no one, and that Freud’s fascination with it is itself metaphysical desire.

What is the skandalon, and what is the Gospel’s alternative to it?

The model-obstacle that attracts and blocks us. Since humans cannot stop imitating, the alternative is a model who cannot become a rival: in the Gospels, Christ, who imitates only the Father and wants nothing we could take from him.